I Introduction
Singapore's experience with international capital flows over the past two decades or so has been a rather -although not completely -benign one, owing to strong fundamentals and generally well-conceived macro-economic policies. At the same time, useful lessons can be learnt, regarding issues such as exchange rate policy, the policy of non-internationalization of the Singapore dollar, and unavoidable fallout effects of capital flow volatility even in generally sound environments and how these may best be dealt with.
A feature of Singapore's economy that sets it apart from various of the other countries discussed in this Conference is its well-developed banking system and equities market, and the fact that it is on a -modified -currency board (CB) system. Its bond market is, however, less developed, although in recent years as discussed below measures have been taken to foster its growth. It may be useful, therefore, to begin by comparing Singapore's experience with that of another state with a well-developed financial system, namely Hong Kong: the latter, in addition, operates what may be termed a 'pure' CB system. Notwithstanding the economic similarities, Singapore and Hong Kong have had rather different experiences with capital flows, and an examination of why this has been so turns out to be rather instructive. In Section II, therefore, we briefly examine Hong Kong's experience during the Asian Crisis of 1997-98, and identify its 'areas of vulnerability'. In Section III, we discuss Singapore's policy background and how it responded to a significant speculative attack in 1985, and draw lessons from this. Further lessons are drawn in Section IV, when we consider Singapore's experience during the Asian Crisis of 1997-98. Section V discusses Singapore's debt markets, an interesting feature being that both Singapore and Hong Kong have in recent years encouraged foreign enterprises to float bond issues in S$ and HK$ respectively, and Section VI concludes. An Annex provides a chronology of the evolution of capital controls (specifically, the evolution of the non-internationalization policy) in Singapore.
II Hong Kong -the 1997-98 experience
As indicated above, our discussion here will be fairly brief, given that our main focus is on Singapore, and is designed primarily to provide a comparative perspective on Singapore's experience. 1 A minimalist definition of a pure CB system is that it is one in which (a) domestic currency is issued or redeemed only in exchange for foreign currency, and (b) at a fixed exchange rate, usually vis-a-vis a single foreign currency, termed the reserve currency. A modified CB system, discussed further below, is then one in which (a) holds, but not (b). A pure system aptly describes the Hong Kong situation, with the exchange rate fixed at HK$7.8:US$1 since October 1983. Moreover, the monetary base in Hong Kong was rather small, given that it does not impose reserve requirements on banks and has an efficient, real-time interbank payment system so that 'the aggregate balance that banks maintain in their clearing accounts held with the currency board'
(Yam 1998b) is low. This rendered Hong Kong vulnerable to speculative capital outflows, of which there were a number in mid-1997 through mid-1998: these did not succeed, in part because the resulting high interest rates adversely affected the speculators too, who had borrowed Hong Kong dollars in the interbank market to launch their attacks. The high interest rates (the overnight interest rate actually rose to 280% on October 23 1997) and their adverse effects on the stock market and economic activity in general were however a source of concern.
2 The really major attack, however, occurred in August 1998, and Yam (1998b) describes the so-called 'double-play' thus:
'In August [after an announcement that 'first-quarter GDP growth had been
negative'] the speculators adopted a more sophisticated ploy. They introduced a form of double play aimed at playing off the currency board system against the stock and futures markets. First, to avoid being squeezed by high interest rates, they prefunded themselves in Hong Kong dollars in the debt market, swapping US dollars for Hong Kong dollars with multilateral institutions that have raised Hong
Kong dollars through the issue of debt. At the same time, they accumulated large short positions in the stock index futures market. They then sought to engineer extreme conditions in the money market by dumping huge amounts of Hong Kong dollars. This sell-off was intended to cause [either a devaluation or] a sharp interest rate hike, which in turn would have sent the stock market plummeting. The collapse of the stock market would have enabled them to reap a handsome profit from the futures contracts they had taken out.'
Presumably, a double play facilitates a stronger currency attack, since the higher interest cost resulting from an attack of a given size is at least partly offset by the possible gains from short-selling in the stock index futures market. Rzepkowski points out (p. 17) that speculators also engaged in short-selling of stocks, and that 'the hedge funds involved in the speculation were identified as being the Quantum Fund of George Soros, the Tiger Fund, the Moore Global Investment, and the Long Term Capital Management'.
Their prefunding activities had driven the Hong Kong interest rate premium over the US dollar to about 5 percentage points (Yam, 1998a) . It was estimated (Yam, 1998b ) that 'the hedge funds involved had amassed in excess of HK$30 billion in currency borrowings, at an interest cost of around HK$4 million a day. They also held an estimated 80,000 short contracts, which translated into the following calculation: for every fall of 1,000 points in the Hang Seng index they stood to make a profit of HK$4 billion.' Owing to the marking-to-market of their margin accounts with the Futures Exchange, they stood to gain daily from incremental falls in the Hang Seng index (Rzepkowski, .
In the event, the attack proved unsuccessful. Like Singapore, Hong Kong has very substantial nonmonetary foreign reserves -reserves in excess of that required to back the monetary base. At the time, it was unexpectedly confronted with a fiscal deficit, and had to convert part of these reserves into Hong Kong dollars to meet its fiscal obligations. Hang Seng Index value…About 13% of its nonmonetary reserves..were allocated to these interventions, inducing an important injection of liquidity into the money market' (ibid.).
By November, the portfolio had risen to US$19 billion in value, and during the interim speculators 'were forced to close out their short positions, in many cases with heavy losses ' (Yam, 1998b) . The portfolio was subsequently placed under the management of a separate company at arms-length from the HKMA, with the aim of divesting it gradually.
After August 1998, systemic improvements were introduced, with the intention of minimizing the occurrence of future attacks. The Exchange Fund, which manages Hong Kong's monetary and nonmonetary reserves had since 1990 issued bills to promote the development of the local bond market, and in September 1998 virtually unrestricted discounting of Exchange Fund bills by commercial banks at the discount window of the HKMA, at non-penal rates, was introduced. Effectively, this almost doubled the size of the monetary base, and serves to significantly reduce the interest rate response to a capital outflow of a given magnitude (Rzepkowski, . In addition, the government has 'brought in a 30-Point package tightening the regulation of the securities and future markets. Measures in the package include the strict enforcement of the T+2 settlement process, imposing a super margin on brokers with highly concentrated positions, introducing the client identity rule, increasing the penalty for naked short selling, creating a new offence for unreported short sales, and introducing new requirements for stock lenders to keep proper records of their lending activities. In parallel, SEHK re-introduced the up-tick rule (no short selling below the current best ask price) for covered short 'the hypothesis of rational investors taking short positions in two markets (based on an assessment of economic fundamentals) and the hypothesis of a double play (suggesting market manipulation) are observationally equivalent' (p. 44). One could hypothesize, alternatively, that the weakening fundamentals, due to both domestic and regional developments, had 'pushed' the economy into a zone in which multiple equilibria (discussed further below) existed. Speculators then endeavoured to drive the economy to the unfavourable equilibrium (possibly by hoping that their actions would serve as a signal to others), seeking to reap large profits in the process, and were not averse to resorting to questionable means (such as naked short selling) to do so. One would then interpret the HKMA's actions as seeking to maintain the economy at the favourable equilibrium -successfully, as it turned out. In this framework, the equilibria themselves -in particular the equilibrium level of stock prices -depend inter alia on the extent of policy intervention by the authorities. 3 Prior to launching their attack in August, the hedge funds had borrowed Hong Kong stocks, to a large extent in the more efficient offshore market, from international fund managers and custodians (Rzepkowski, fn. 20) , and in addition, owing to 'lax settlement requirements ' (Yam, 1998a, quoted in Rzepkowski, fn. 22 Third, is the unrestricted ease of short-selling, in stock spot and index futures markets, and the laxity in the enforcement of settlement requirements. Last is the initial small size of the monetary base, coupled with reliance on the autopilot mechanism of the CB al. simply assume that they will lose), depending on the actions of other speculators and of the authorities, which affect interest rates and present and future stock prices. It is also entirely conceivable that in the Hong Kong case speculators failed to fully anticipate the extent and nature of the authorities' reaction. Rzepkowski (p. 28) adopts a somewhat similar view of the underlying process to ours, arguing that 'the logic underlying the several attacks against the HK dollar rests essentially on self-fulfilling expectations and on a pure contagion'. Next, Chakravorti and Lall (2000) formally model a speculative double-play, and conclude (p. 23) that 'government intervention in the equity market may either reduce interest rate or reduce the downward price pressure in equity markets but not both', owing to countervailing actions by speculators. They very peculiarly assume, however, that such intervention has no monetary effects, contrary to Rzepkowski's observation earlier, and they also overlook that in Hong Kong, as indicated above, a fairly large sum of nonmonetary reserves was converted into Hong Kong dollars to meet fiscal obligations. A useful policy lesson here is that, if intervention is to be undertaken in response to a double-play, it should also be targeted at both equities and money markets. 5 This is a possibility which Devereux (2003) does not address, in his comparison of the implications of the differing exchange rate regimes of Hong Kong and Singapore for longer run trends in inflation and real exchange rates, and for short-run macroeconomic and real exchange rate volatility. It is also not clear whether his short-run simulation analysis imposes expectational rationality with regards to the exchange rate (equal, in his model, to the expected rate of inflation of traded-goods prices) and the price of land.
system. 6 We turn now to a discussion of some of Singapore's experiences with capital flow volatility, and we should also recognize that not infrequently a tension exists between the desire for short-run stability, and the desire to foster deeper and more open financial and capital markets for purposes of long-run growth and development of the economy.
III Singapore -policy background and early experience
Any discussion of Singapore's experience must assign a prominent place to a major, In his empirical work, Rzepkowski utilizes the information in currency option prices to infer the expected intensity of an HK dollar devaluation, and then, in a VAR framework, demonstrates the existence of a speculative double-play: 'A circular scheme characterized the formation of self-fulfilling expectations. The (expected) intensity of a HK dollar devaluation induced a sharp decrease in the index futures prices, which contributed to make the volatility of the HSI (Hang Seng Index) soar, in turn exacerbating the speculative pressures against the HK dollar' (p. 27). However, he then argues that the HKMA's stock market interventions in August 1998 were ineffective, since they 'achieved to push up temporarily the index futures price, but induced a significant rise in the market volatility' (ibid.). Instead, it was the technical measures introduced in September 1998 to strengthen the CB system (p. 4 above) which, he claims, dampened the pressures against the currency. Rzepkowski acknowledges that his options analysis abstracts from the possibility of a time-varying risk premium, and imposes 'strong assumptions on the underlying dynamics' (p. 29), and so the robustness of his findings remains an open issue. 7 We draw here mainly on Ngiam (1996, 1998) , but critique their formal analysis below, as well as on Lee (2001) .
likewise. The terms "residents" or "nonresidents" include bank and nonbank customers.' 8 Chan and Ngiam (1996, p. 6) point out that, 'To ensure that its regulations are not being circumvented through financial derivatives, the MAS has defined Singapore dollar credit facilities to cover a wide range of financial instruments, including loans, foreign exchange swaps, currency swaps, interest rate swaps, facilities incorporating options, and forward rate agreements in Singapore dollars'. 9 Subsequently, on July 18 1992, the MAS issued a circular amending the policy. Consultation with the MAS was not required for credit facilities extended in Singapore dollars, in any amount, to residents or nonresidents to facilitate direct exports from and imports to Singapore, and for payment bonds in favour of Singapore parties, or payment guarantees, in respect of 'economic activities' in Singapore, where the latter specifically excluded financial and portfolio investments.
Forward sales of Singapore dollars earned from exports to Singapore were also permitted.
At the same time, banks were told that they should not finance in Singapore dollars 'activities which have no bearing on Singapore' (op. cit., p. 5), including direct or portfolio investments outside Singapore by nonresidents, third-country trade by nonresident-controlled companies, and nonresident subscription to equity in a Singapore company where the proceeds are used for takeovers or financial investments. 'In addition, banks have been advised against granting Singapore-dollar credit facilities to nonresidents for speculating in the local financial and property markets' (ibid.). For all other activities -which are quite wide-ranging, and include third-country trade as well as direct and portfolio investments overseas by residents, and direct investment and housing 8 Quoted in Chan and Ngiam (1996, p. 5) . Singapore also has a very active offshore Asian Currency market (in non-Singapore currencies), and banks are required to maintain separate accounts for Asian Currency Units or ACU's (op. cit., p. 4). 'Nonresidents include Singapore-incorporated companies, which are majority-owned or otherwise controlled by nonresidents' (Lee, p. 34) . 9 'Without any restrictions, a firm or individual can borrow Singapore dollars indirectly by first borrowing US dollars and then doing a foreign exchange swap (which involves the buying of the Singapore dollar spot with the simultaneous selling of the Singapore dollar forward). This effectively replicates, or synthesizes, a Singapore dollar money market loan with a "lock-in" Singapore dollar interest rate' (ibid.). accompanying this Notice, it was stated that banks 'are expected to institute appropriate 10 Chan and Ngiam (1996, p. 8) also suggest that '(a)s the forward market involving the Singapore dollar is rather thin, it cannot provide an effective vehicle for speculation': moreover, the MAS monitors forward transactions with a view to ensuring that these are used for hedging and not for speculation. They further suggest that borrowing by residents for speculative purposes does 'not seem to be a major concern as the Government can bring them to task if they bring down the Singapore dollar' (fn. 27): the point being made here probably relates to the greater ease of monitoring, and if necessary regulating, the activities of residents, and perhaps also the greater sophistication and speed of action of foreign hedge funds and the like.
internal controls and processes to comply with this restriction': these may include 'written confirmation from the non-resident financial institution specifying the purpose of funding', and a 'formal evaluation process of the client profile, which provides a clear basis for assessing that the client is unlikely to use the S$ proceeds for currency speculation'. Banks are also required to report to MAS monthly their aggregate outstanding S$ lending to non-resident financial institutions. Clearly, there is an element of judgment involved in assessing that a client is 'unlikely' to engage in speculation, but to date this does not appear to have created difficulties for banks.
The non-internationalization policy has thus rather effectively blocked one of the 12 We thus observe a role being assigned to discretion in decision-making, and both this and the same-day covering rule are in all likelihood reflective of the fact that the literature is not unambiguous regarding the net benefit of short-selling, especially in the presence of large players. (2002)). In response, as Figure 1 shows, the S$ depreciated gradually from 1985 to the beginning of 1987. The depreciation was not an entirely smooth affair, however, as we now discuss.
It appears that speculators overestimated the extent to which the authorities were prepared to permit the exchange rate to depreciate. By August 1985, the S$ had depreciated to about S$2.20:US$1 (from about S$2.10:US$1 earlier), and it then came under speculative pressure, primarily through spot conversions of S$ into foreign currencies (Chan and Ngiam (1996) , pp. 7-8) By Thursday September 12, it had fallen to almost $2.31:US$1 (Starr (1985)). The following Monday, the MAS intervened, by spending US$100 million (amounting to less than 0.1% of its foreign reserves, according to Chan and Ngiam) to purchase S$. The consequence was an immediate rise in the overnight interbank rate, which reached 120% on September 18, and the S$ strengthened to S$2.20:US$1 -an appreciation of about 5% in just 4 days. 'Substantial losses have almost certainly been incurred by foreign banks as a result of speculating against the Singapore dollar' (Textline, 1985) . Thereafter, liquidity was gradually restored to the money market, but it was also made clear that the MAS would not hesitate to act again if necessary.
Clearly, in addition to the non-internationalization policy and the discouragement of speculative short-selling of shares, the exchange-rate policy played a significant role in defusing the speculative attack. Initially permitting the exchange rate to depreciate to S$2.20:US$1, in line with weakening fundamentals, took some of the edge off speculative pressure. It would appear that the authorities then permitted, for some time, a further depreciation owing to uncertainty regarding the path of fundamentals. When it was determined that this depreciation was excessive, they were in a position to inflict substantial losses on speculators. Like Hong Kong, Singapore's very healthy reserve position is a valuable asset in this regard. Unlike Hong Kong, however, non-adherence to a fixed peg implied that speculators faced a 'two-way bet': this may have constrained the intensity of the attack then, and by strengthening the MAS' reputation for toughness reduced their willingness to attack in the future as well. Finally, the flexibility with which the MAS generally permits short-term uncollateralized borrowing by banks, in support of its exchange rate policy (MAS, n.d., p. 6), meant that the speculative pressure prior to the MAS intervention did not appreciably raise short-term interest rates (Textline,
ibid.).
We proceed next to examine lessons learnt during the Asian Crisis of 1997-98. 14 14 Chan and Ngiam's (1998) formal analysis of the 1985 episode appears, however, to be flawed. They erroneously assume that the exchange rate was appreciated from a preexisting disequilibrium level, but that interest rates nonetheless fell because, by underscoring the authorities' determination not to allow the currency to weaken, it reduced the perceived probability of a devaluation. In fact, however, interest rates did as indicated above rise after the appreciation, owing to the liquidity squeeze, and only fell subsequently. The key element of losses imposed on speculators by the appreciation is not included in their analysis, and neither do they recognize that the appreciation was intended to bring the exchange rate to an (equilibrium?) level that was lower than the S$2.10 level originally. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the perceived devaluation probability, and the interest rate, falling, for good, if the exchange rate did indeed remain overvalued.
IV Singapore -the 1997 experience
We begin with a succinct statement by Chan and Ngiam (1998, p. 259) :
'During the recent Asian currency crisis, which began when Thailand allowed its baht to float on July 2, 1997, the Singapore dollar, along with all the regional currencies, showed a significant fall against the US dollar for six months. 
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In both years, the non-internationalization policy and the short-sale restrictions would also have helped. Singapore's experience also exemplifies the point 15 Hashimoto (2003, p. 256) obtains 'puzzling' results in seeking to identify speculative pressure against the S$ in 1997, including the fact that a large depreciation occurred when her estimated depreciation likelihood was lowest. Methodologically, her assumption that speculators condition only on the M2/foreign exchange reserves ratio in deciding when to launch an attack appears rather restrictive, and it is also not clear what her estimated critical level of 0.25 for this ratio for Singapore signifies, since the actual ratio was above this throughout her sample period (1986-97).
made earlier (p. 6) regarding the merits of gradual rather than discrete adjustments in situations that are not too extreme.
Notwithstanding the fairly smooth exchange rate adjustment, Singapore was not spared from volatility in other asset markets, particularly equities and property. From a high of 2055.44 in January 1997, the Straits Times Index of stock prices dropped by 60%
to 856.43 in September 1998 before recovering (Ngiam, 2000, p. 6 , and his Figure 2 ).
The private property price index dropped monotonically by about 40% from 270.0 in the first quarter of 1997 to 163.7 in the fourth quarter of 1998 (ibid., and his Figure 3 ). Real GDP in fact declined by 0.9% in 1998 (Table 1 below) . It would not be correct to ascribe these developments solely to contagion effects, and trade and banking exposure to the region. Other factors, such as the global electronics slowdown, the downturn in the domestic real estate cycle, and (over time) the gradually increasing competition from
China and India, also played a significant part. However, Singapore's experience in 1997-98 underscores the fact that countries that 'plug into' the global economic grid will tend to experience not only higher mean growth rates, but also greater variability of those growth rates. As has often been noted, capital can flow out of a country, as well as into it. Selective measures aimed at particular sectors can mitigate the degree of volatility, but are unlikely to be capable of effectively eliminating it. Of course, economic agents will in due course learn to make improved risk-return calculations, and at the same time governments would be well-advised to develop various coping mechanisms, such as a reasonable degree of social insurance, and provision of skills upgrading and re-training facilities, to help those who are severely affected by shorter-term cyclical, as well as longer-term structural, changes.
V Debt Markets in Singapore
We begin with some figures, for the 1990's. Table 2 , from Ong (1998), provides information on the debt-to-asset ratio (DAR) of nonfinancial corporations in Singapore, Canada, and the U.S. The ratio in Singapore has declined somewhat in the 1990's, and is fairly modest at 0.31, of which 0.21 is due to short-term debt (defined as 'the sum of bank loans and overdrafts, short-term commercial papers and other short-term loans' (op. cit., p. 9)), and 0.10 to long-term debt ('the sum of preference shares, bonds and debentures, and other long-term loans' (ibid.)).
With regards to external debt, the Singapore Department of Statistics (SDOS) distinguishes between external debt per se -defined as 'all overseas loans drawn by our corporate, government and household sectors, but excludes our banks' overseas interbank loans' (2000, p. 1; we discuss bank borrowing below) -and 'secondary forms of external debt', comprising negotiable 'debt securities' (SDOS, 1998, p. 2) such as bonds, debentures, and treasury bills, and trade credits ('direct extension of credit by suppliers and buyers for goods and services transactions and advance payments for work that is in progress' (ibid.)). Tables 3-8 provide information on these, during the 1990's.
'Singapore has had no public external debt since 1995' (SDOS (1998), p. 2), owing to its regular budget surpluses. Its debt sustainability ratios have been much more favourable than those of other countries in the region. About three-quarters of the external corporate debt was contracted by foreign-owned companies.
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Turning to secondary forms of external debt, SDOS (2000) observes, in regards to Table 7 , 'Singapore's external liability in debt securities nearly doubled from $2.0 billion at end-95 to $3.7 billion at end-98…It was dominated by 4 foreign (3 Japanese and 1 U.S.) companies. The debt securities are mostly short and medium term notes issued to provide additional funds for the companies' operation'. Regarding FDI non-equity liabilities, and excluding debt securities, a significant portion comprised loans from parent companies. After 1995, Singapore was a net creditor in all trade credit transactions (FDI and non-FDI). As Table 8 shows, it was also a net creditor in all the other categories covered in the preceding tables, namely debt securities, FDI-related loans, and Loans to Other Non-Residents, with the exception of borrowing from external banks (Table 3) : the figure of almost S$12 billion here is modest relative to other figures below, and has not been netted against lending by Singapore banks to external nonbank entities, on which data is not provided.
The overall picture that emerges is that of a comfortable external debt position, as far as nonbank entities are concerned. Turning to banks, 17 as of December 1997 the DBU's owed S$94.7 billion to banks outside Singapore (including to the head offices of foreignowned banks): however, they had also lent S$69.7 billion to banks outside Singapore Given Singapore's modest overall external debt position, its large foreign exchange reserves (amounting to about six times the size of the monetary base 18 ), and its small 17 We focus here on DBU's, since the offshore market or the ACU's transact virtually entirely in foreign currencies. 18 These very large reserves are to a not insignificant degree a reflection of Singapore's fairly low domestic absorption capacity (given its small size), juxtaposed against its large savings rate over many years. Nor does it appear that such large reserve holdings impose a significant opportunity cost on the economy: a Straits Times (Singapore) report of July 22 2004 by Audrey Tan quotes the Assistant Managing Director of the MAS, Ong Chong Tee, as saying 'we are invested across a diversified range of markets and currencies', and that, owing to 'the better performance of global equity markets' MAS' profits in the year ended March 31 2004 jumped to S$4.99 billion (from just S$623 million the previous year). The bulk of these profits arose from investing its foreign reserves, which totaled US$96.3 billion at the beginning of the year. The report adds that 'MAS does not disclose the rate of return on its investments', but that, according to Mr Ong, 'on average, MAS' performance would place it in the top 25 th percentile of its peer group of fund exchange rate depreciation relative to that of other countries in the region, it is not surprising that its external indebtedness was not a noticeable aggravating factor in the 1997-98 downturn. It is, however, of interest to examine the reasons for the historical underdevelopment of Singapore's bond markets (as seen above, its banking system and equities market are much more developed), and to review the measures taken since 1998 to foster their growth, with particular reference to their implications for the S$ noninternationalization policy. 19 We may divide the reasons for the historical underdevelopment into supply and demand factors, while recognizing that there is some interaction between the two.
Perhaps the most important supply factor has been the healthy fiscal position of the government, which has resulted in a limited need for it to issue bonds. Moreover, the bonds that were issued were of low maturity (not more than 7 years, prior to 1998), and the bulk of them, and of Treasury Bills, were held by banks and finance companies (to a significant extent to meet minimum liquidity requirements), as well as insurance companies, resulting in a very limited secondary bond market. (It should, however, be noted that we exclude here 'specially-issued, non-tradable, long-term government bonds which are held by the CPF (Central Provident Fund) until maturity' (Ngiam and Loh, p. 6 ). The CPF is Singapore's compulsory saving scheme, and its holdings of these special bonds substantially exceeds the outstanding amount of other, tradable government securities: Ngiam and Loh add, 'Most of the proceeds from such (CPF-purchased) bonds are probably channeled to the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC) for investment in foreign assets' (ibid.).)
An important consequence of the underdevelopment of the governmental bond market, particularly the secondary market, was the absence of a benchmark yield curve to facilitate corporate issuance, and active trading, of bonds. At the same time, it may be managers'. Substantial sums are also invested by the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (in financial and real assets abroad) and Temasek Holdings (mostly in government-linked-companies domestically), but the precise amounts are not known, and neither is the former's rate of return on its investments. 19 Valuable references here are Ngiam and Loh (2002) , Lee (2001) , and US Embassy, Singapore (2001).
hypothesized that Singaporeans' 'appetite' for a secure, long-term asset has to a large extent been met, albeit compulsorily, by their CPF savings, notwithstanding the somewhat low return on such savings (Asher (2004) ). They may thus wish to channel most if not all of their remaining, discretionary savings (beyond that used to finance home ownership) to more liquid bank deposits and to higher-yielding but risky equity investments, which helps to account for the more advanced state of development of Singapore's banking system and equities market -which in turn makes it easier for Singapore corporations to raise funds from these sources.
With a largely captive market for government securities, the government could afford to pay low yields on these, and in addition 'Singapore investors have to pay tax on interest income whereas they do not have to pay tax on capital gains obtained from investing in equities and properties' (Ngiam and Loh, p. 11) . Lastly, much of Singapore's economic growth has historically been driven by large inflows of FDI, with foreign-owned companies receiving major infusions of equity and loans from their parent companies.
The Asian Crisis of 1997-98 provided a major impetus to a shift in policy thinking regarding bond market development in Singapore. The Crisis had highlighted the dangers of currency and maturity mismatches in corporate borrowing, and Singapore banks had also suffered losses due to exposure to the region, although none was in danger of collapsing. It therefore appeared prudent to diversify the sources of, particularly longterm, borrowing on the part of Singapore corporations, and encourage them to borrow in S$. Also, with economic growth the pool of discretionary saving was growing substantially, notwithstanding the high CPF contribution rate, and fund management companies had become increasingly active in the economy. One may surmise that concomitantly the demand for market determination of bond yields, and of greater market liquidity, was also growing. This was underscored by the severe fall in equity and property prices during the Crisis. From a longer-term, developmental perspective, fostering of a further pillar of Singapore's dynamic financial sector was also deemed desirable. The intention was to encourage not only Singaporean but also foreign corporations, and multilateral institutions, to float bond issues in Singapore. (2004) provide a detailed analysis of the diversification benefits from holding a range of Asian-currency bonds, in addition to those from other areas. 21 'However, banks are required to submit monthly reports on details of interest rate derivative transactions exceeding S$5 million with counter-parties outside Singapore' (ibid.).
Of particular interest for our purpose is 'the opening up of the S$ bond market to foreign issuers..accomplished through MAS Notice 757, introduced in August 1998 and amended in November 1999' (Ngiam and Loh, p. 8) . 22 The proceeds from such issues could be retained in the form of S$ deposits with banks in Singapore pending use:
however, if and when the proceeds were to be used outside Singapore, they had to be converted or swapped into foreign currency before remitting abroad (ibid.). Funds raised for use in Singapore by nonbank nonresidents for designated economic activities nonfinancial entities (such as corporate treasury centers) were liberalized, so that only credit in excess of S$5 million to nonresident financial entities for speculating against the S$ was prohibited, and even the latter were permitted to engage in a wider range of derivative transactions (such as S$ currency options) with financial institutions. The intention was to promote the deepening of such markets. We discuss the overall implications of measures to promote financial market development in the Conclusion.
VI Conclusion
Singapore clearly has strong defenses against what it deems to be excessive exchange rate volatility triggered by 'destabilizing' capital flows. These include its strong fundamentals (discussed by Chan and Ngiam above (p. 13) ), the adoption of a CB system, and the non-adherence to a fixed currency peg when the economic situation changes. (Indeed, an important lesson is that it is the package of policies in totality that can meaningfully be evaluated, rather than individual policies in isolation from the overall policy context.) Under the imperative of promoting the continued growth and diversification of its financial sector -an important pillar of the economy, accounting for (Lawton, 1999, Section 3) , and also maintains a large trader reporting system. Somewhat ironically, in the light of DPM Lee's observations, while Singapore has moved to a more relaxed regulatory regime, Hong Kong has 'tightened up' somewhat, and the two systems are closer than they previously were. This perhaps is where the golden mean lies -a fairly, although not completely, unrestrictive, rule-based system in general, but with provision for discretionary intervention when the situation warrants. Do such discretionary provisions create uncertainty for business, and can they be abused? If they are intelligently employed, they can be very valuable in times of stress, and perhaps the best safeguard against abuse is public analysis and discussion whenever they are employed.
Annex: Chronology of Capital Controls in Singapore June 1 1978
Exchange controls were completely liberalized, in line with efforts to develop Singapore as a banking and financial centre (including offshore banking). From then on, 'residents are allowed to borrow, lend and invest freely in foreign currencies. Banks in Singapore that are licensed to deal in Asian Currency Units can freely accept deposits in foreign currencies. Residents may deal freely in spot and forward foreign exchange transactions. Non-residents are freely allowed to make direct and portfolio investments in the country' (MAS (1999), p. 2).
November 1 1983
MAS Notice 621, setting out the policy of non-internationalization of the Singapore dollar, issued (pp. 7-8 above).
July 18 1992
The MAS amends the policy by distinguishing three categories of activities:
(i) The approved category: consultation with the MAS was not required for credit facilities extended in S$, in any amount, to residents or nonresidents to facilitate direct exports from and imports to Singapore, and for payment bonds in favour of Singapore parties, or payment guarantees (including guarantees for tax payments), in respect of 'economic activities' in Singapore, where the latter specifically excluded financial and portfolio investments. Forward sales of Singapore dollars earned from exports to Singapore were also permitted. (ii)
The banned category: banks were not to finance in S$ 'activities which have no bearing on Singapore', including direct or portfolio investments outside Singapore by nonresidents, third-country trade by nonresident-controlled companies, and nonresident subscription to equity in a Singapore company where the proceeds are used for takeovers or financial investments. Banks were also not to extend S$ credit facilities, in any amounts, to nonresidents for speculating in the local financial and property markets. (iii) The unlisted category: for all other activities -which are quite wide-ranging, and include third-country trade as well as direct and portfolio investments overseas by residents, and direct investment and housing development in Singapore by nonresidents -the 1983 ruling calling for consultation with the MAS continued to apply.
August 1998
In conjunction with an 'extensive program of financial sector liberalization' (Lee, p. 35) , the MAS issues the first version of Notice 757, which replaced Notice 621: this and subsequent versions sought to successively relax restrictions against various financial transactions. While concluding that 'the basic policy remains sound', the MAS stated that 'some judicious relaxation of specific restrictions would foster the development of capital markets with minimal incremental risks' (quoted in Lee, op. cit.) .
The Notice fully liberalized the extension of S$ credit facilities to residents. In addition, banks could now engage in the following activities without prior consultation with the MAS (ibid.):
(i) Extension of S$ credit facilities to, and arranging S$ equity listings or bond issues for, nonbank nonresidents if the S$ proceeds are used for designated economic activities in Singapore.
Extension of S$ credit facilities to nonbank nonresidents for financial investments -shares, bonds, deposits, and commercial properties in Singapore -up to S$ 5 million. (iii) Extension of S$ credit facilities up to S$20 million to nonresidents, via repurchase agreements of Singapore Government Securities (SGS).
Engaging in a limited list of derivative transactions, including hedging of currency or interest rates from the activities listed in (i) above, and transacting in S$ interest rate futures with nonresidents.
For other activities, consultation with the MAS continued to be required, and in addition the S$ proceeds from credit facilities and bond and equity listings arranged for nonbank nonresidents had to be converted or swapped into foreign currency if they were to be used outside Singapore. Also, the extension of S$ credit facilities to nonresidents for certain purposes -including speculating in the S$ currency and interest rate markets, financing third-country trades, and financing acquisition of shares of companies not listed on the Stock Exchange or Central Limit Order Book -was explicitly prohibited.
November 1999
Banks were permitted to engage in an expanded range of activities without prior consultation with the MAS, including extension of S$ credit facilities to, and transacting in S$ interest rate products with, other banks, merchant banks, finance companies, and insurance companies in Singapore; extension of S$ credit facilities of any amount to nonresidents via repos of SGS or other S$ bonds; arranging S$ equity listings for nonresident companies as long as the S$ proceeds were converted into foreign currency before being used outside Singapore; and all S$ derivative transactions with residents, as well as an expanded range of derivative transactions with nonresidents, including optionrelated products with nonfinancial counterparts. However, banks were still required to consult with the MAS before transacting in S$ currency options or option-related products with nonbank financial institutions, and before extending S$ credit facilities exceeding S$5 million to banks and other financial institutions outside Singapore, and were not permitted to transact in S$ currency options or option-related products with other banks.
December 2000
Nonresidents were permitted to borrow Singapore dollars (from banks) to buy SGS and SDCB (Singapore Dollar Corporate Bonds), as well as S$ equities and real estate. Banks were also permitted to extend S$ credit facilities exceeding S$5 million to nonresidents to fund offshore activities, as long as the S$ proceeds are swapped into foreign currency, to transact in S$ currency options with other banks and financial institutions in Singapore, and to transact with nonresidents in a broad range of derivative products, including crosscurrency swaps and currency options for hedging purposes, S$ interest rate derivatives, and equity derivatives. Foreign securities intermediaries were permitted to freely obtain S$ financing domestically, and, effective March 1 2001, offshore banks were permitted to engage freely in S$ swap activity with nonbanks.
March 2002
S$ credit facilities to nonresident nonfinancial entities (such as corporate treasury centers) were liberalized, so that only credit in excess of S$5 million to nonresident financial entities, including banks, finance companies, insurance companies, hedge funds, and securities dealers and brokers, for speculating against the S$ was prohibited. Even the latter entities were permitted to engage in a wider range of derivative transactions (such as S$ currency options) with financial institutions, except that foreign exchange swaps involving a spot sale of S$ to the nonresident in the first leg remained under the rubric of S$ credit facilities. Apart from this, transactions involving asset swaps, crosscurrency swaps and cross-currency repos were fully liberalized. The intention was to promote the deepening of such markets, and make it easier for S$ equities and debts to be swapped into foreign currencies for overseas use. Financial institutions were also no longer required to ensure that S$ credit facilities extended to finance investments be withdrawn when the investments were liquidated, thereby lessening the burden of tracking fund use.
May 28 2004
Nonresident nonfinancial issuers of S$ bonds and equities were no longer required to swap or convert their S$ proceeds into foreign currencies before remitting abroad, so as to 'allow the issuers greater flexibility in managing their S$ funds'. For nonresident financial institutions, however, the requirement was retained, in respect of S$ proceeds from equity and bond listings, as well as from borrowing from banks. Banks are also required to report to MAS monthly their aggregate outstanding S$ lending to non-resident financial institutions. It was reiterated that 'banks shall not extend S$ credit facilities [exceeding S$5 million] to non-resident financial institutions if there is reason to believe that the S$ proceeds may be used for S$ currency speculation'. 
